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RICHARDSON v. STATE: AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED
In Richardson v. State,' an Indiana case in which the defendant
was charged with having perjured herself during a grand jury investiga-
tion, the prosecution called as a witness the foreman of the grand jury
before whom the defendant had testified. The foreman stated that while
he remembered the substance of the defendant's testimony, he could not
repeat it verbatim without the aid of the grand jury transcript. He was
then allowed to respond to questioning by reading from the document.2
In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Indiana Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's ruling that the transcript was used solely for the
purpose of refreshing the recollection of the witness, and that such use
was proper. A dissenting opinion' agreed with the majority's position in
respect to the applicable law,4 but disputed the majority's holding that
the witness was using the transcript simply to revive his present recollec-
tion. The dissent contended that the foreman used the transcript as a
substitute for present memory and that this evidence, under Indiana law,
constituted inadmissible past recollection recorded rather than admissible
present recollection revived.5
It seems clear that the witness, in reading verbatim from the tran-
script, was using that document, a record of past recollection, as a sub-
stitute for present memory. If a witness's memory is truly revived by a
document, there should be no need for him to read it after he has examin-
1. -Ind.-, 266 N.E.2d 51 (1971).
2. Apparently, another grand jury member was called to testify at the defendant's
trial. He was also unable to repeat the defendant's testimony verbatim and was allowed
to read from the transcript.
3. Throughout this note the dissenting opinion referred to is that of Judge
DeBruler. Judge Prentice also filed a dissent which substantially agreed with Judge
DeBruler's.
4. The majority reaffirmed Indiana's recognition of the doctrine of present
memory revived and in dictum rejected the doctrine of past recollection recorded. -
Ind. at-, 266 N.E.2d at 53. The dissent agreed with the majority on this point:
There is no question that a witness may use a written memo to refresh his
memory concerning past events. . . . [W]hen this is permitted, the evidence
concerning the past events is the testimony relating the independent recollection
of the witness and not the written memo.
Id. at -, 266 N.E.2d at 55.
The court first adopted the doctrine of present memory revived in Clark v. State,
4 Ind. 156 (1853).
5. It is obvious that the witness is reading the transcript verbatim and is not
testifying from memory concerning the testimony of appellant before the Grand
Jury. . . . [A]ll we have is the reading verbatim of an unauthenticated,
inadmissible, purported transcript of the grand jury proceedings.
Id. at -, 266 N.E.2d at 56-57.
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ed it. Richardson thus afforded the supreme court an opportunity to align
itself with the large majority of other jurisdictions which apply the
doctrine of past recollection recorded to situations in which such a record
is used as a substitute for present memory.' Rather than take this
opportunity, however, the court rejected the doctrine and sanctioned this
type of evidence on the tenuous ground that the transcript was merely
used to aid the present memory of the witness.
The Richardson decision is disturbing in that it exemplifies the
general approach of Indiana courts to situations in which a record of past
recollection is used as a substitute for present memory. Under this
approach, the courts, while refusing to recognize the doctrine of past
recollection recorded, have allowed the admission of such evidence under
exceptions to the hearsay rule and through misapplication of the doctrine
of present recollection revived.
THE INDIANA APPROACH
The doctrine of past recollection recorded applies to two situations.
The first involves a memorandum which so moves a witness's mind that
he remembers making or verifying the document but is able to recall
only a part of the events recorded therein.' The second involves a
memorandum which stimulates a witness's mind so that he is only able
to remember the occurrence of some event and his making or verification
of the memorandum as a record.8 Although justified in other jurisdic-
tions on grounds of elemental necessity,9 the practice of allowing the
use of a memorandum as a substitute for present memory in these
situations was rejected in Clark v. State,"0 an 1853 case in which the
Indiana Supreme Court first dealt with this type of situation. Clark
6. 3 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMmON LAw § 736 (rev. ed. J.
Chadbourn 1970) [hereinafter cited as WIGMOa.]; Annot., 125 A.L.R. 19 (1940);
Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 473 (1962). The doctrine of past recollection recorded is primarily
a common law doctrine. However, Alaska, California, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas and
Oregon are among the states that have adopted by statute the doctrine of past recollec-
tion recorded. ALASKA R. CIv. P. 43(g)(9)(b) (Supp. 1963); CAL. EVID. CODE §
1237 (West 1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1707 (1954); IDAHO CODE § 9-1204 (Supp.
1969); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 60-4 60(a) (1964); Omn. Rxv. STAT. § 45.580 (1969
Repl.).
7. 3 WiGMoRE, supra note 6, § 734; C. McCORMICKc, HANDOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE §§ 9, 276 [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK] ; Morgan, The Relation between
Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 HARv. L. Rxv. 712, 717-18 (1927) [hereinafter
cited as Morgan].
8. Id.
9. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 738. The objective of the doctrine of past recollec-
tion recorded is to secure the best available evidence of an event that a witness can
offer.
10. 4 Ind. 156 (1853).
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involved a witness who claimed a lack of present recollection of the facts
in issue. The witness testified that at a former trial he did have such
knowledge and that a list made from his memory at that trial was correct.
He was allowed by the trial court to read the list into evidence. In
reversing the defendant's conviction on the ground that the trial court
had erroneously allowed such a verbatim reading, the supreme court
stated:
A witness may be permitted to refresh his memory of facts, by
referring to a written memorandum, written either by himself
or by another, at or near the time of the occurrence; but the
memorandum cannot be substituted in the stead of the recollec-
tion of the witness. 1'
Subsequent Indiana decisions have similarly refused to adopt the doctrine
of past recollection recorded.'2
The possible consequences 3 of a complete prohibition of past recol-
lection recorded, however, have been somewhat alleviated by application
of certain exceptions to the hearsay rule'4 which serve to allow the use
11. Id. at 157.
12. Hottenstein v. Hottenstein, 191 Ind. 460, 133 N.E. 489 (1922) ; Southern Ry.
v. State, 165 Ind. 613, 75 N.E. 272 (1905); Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 4
N.E. 197 (1886) ; Bank of Poneto v. Kimmel, 91 Ind. App. 325, 168 N.E. 604 (1929).
13. The primary consequence would be that courts could not admit records of past
recollection into evidence, thus decreasing their ability to resolve disputes justly
and possibly increasing the incidence of perjury.
14. For present purposes, it is only necessary to state that admission of evidence
under these exceptions is justified primarily on two grounds: (1) if courts are to
resolve disputes justly, they must in many instances admit evidence of out-of-court
statements; and, (2) in the situations to which these doctrines apply the possibility
that such a statement has been falsified is minimal. The requirements for the excep-
tions to apply are designed to implement these justifications. To the extent that these
prerequisites are not met, the justifications lose their force. It is unnecessary to set
out here all the prerequisites that Indiana courts have imposed for the admission of
evidence under the exceptions. For these requirements, see McCoRMIcKc, supra note 7,
§ 281-90 (business records), 272-74 (res gestae), 230-38 (prior testimony); 5 WIc-
MORE, supra note 6, §§ 1517-33, 1536-61 (business records), 1370, 1371, 1386-89,
1402-15, 1666-69 (prior testimony) (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1970); 6 id., §§ 1745-61 (res
gestae). A record of past recollection used as a substitute for present memory can also
be admitted as a "prior admission" or "official record" under exceptions to the hear-
say rule. Indiana, however, has never utilized this approach to situations in which a
record of past recollection was used as a substitute for present memory when a past
recollection recorded rationale would have been more appropriate. For a discussion of
the prerequisites to admission of evidence under these exceptions to the hearsay rule,
see MCCORMICK, supra note 7, §§ 239-52 (prior admissions), 291-95 (official records) ;
4 WIGMORE, supra note 6, §§ 1048-87 (prior admissions) (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1970);
5 id., §§ 1630-84 (official records).
It should also be noted that the Indiana statutes dealing with the subject of
admission of written evidence do not alter the common law to such an extent as to
render a treatment of the cases irrelevant. The statutes deal primarily with the
admission of "official records" and "business records." IND. CODE §§ 34-1-16-3 to 6,
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of such evidence as a substitute for present memory. Such an application
may be found in Sage v. State,'5 in which an official stenographer was
permitted to read from his record the testimony of a witness, since
deceased, which had been given at a previous trial. In upholding the trial
court's admission of the evidence, the supreme court alluded to the
propriety of using a memorandum to refresh a witness's memory"0 but
made it clear that its holding was based upon application of the "prior
testimony" exception to the hearsay rule. The court stated:
That the testimony of a deceased witness may be repeated at a
subsequent trial is well settled. . . . It is also settled that the
reproduction of the testimony of a witness, who was examined
on a former trial, is not a violation of the fundamental rule
that the accused has a right to be brought face to face with the
witnesses against him. . . . [W] e think it is also proper to
say that there is much reason why a distinction should be made
in a case where a sworn official stenographer is called to testify
as to the testimony of a deceased witness, and a case where an
ordinary witness is called for that purpose."
Although Sage represented a correct application of an exception to
the hearsay rule,"8 a number of Indiana decisions have upheld admission
of past recollection recorded through misapplication of such exceptions.
In Culver v. Marks," for example, the supreme court upheld the admis-
sion of evidence constituting past recollection recorded" without accept-
ing the doctrine. Despite the availability of witnesses who had made the
business entries in question, the court upheld the admission by finding
that the requirements of the "business records" exception to the hearsay
34-1-17-1 to 18-12, 34-1-65-1, 34-3-1-1 to 2-7, 34-3-4-1 to 3, 34-3-7-1 to 8-1, 34-3-10-1
to 17-3, 34-4-22-1 (1971) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1601 to 1662 (1968).
15. 127 Ind. 15, 26 N.E. 667 (1891) ; accord, Bass v. State, 136 Ind. 165, 36 N.E.
124 (1893).
16. 127 Ind. at 25, 26 N.E. at 671. The court could not justifiably have upheld
the trial court's admission of the evidence on the ground that the stenographer was
simply refreshing his memory because he was clearly using the report as a substitute
for his memory.
17. Id. at 25-26, 26 N.E. at 671.
18. See 5 WIa MOR, supra note 6, §§ 1370, 1371, 1386-89, 1402-15, 1666-69 (3d
ed. 1940, Supp. 1970) ; McCoPmicK, supra note 7, §§ 230-38.
19. 122 Ind. 554, 23 N.E. 1086 (1890) ; accord, Lowe v. Swafford, 209 Ind. 514,
199 N.E. 709 (1936).
20. Culver was a suit against the administratrix of an estate for allowance of a
claim based on certain checks made by her decedent. The entries in the books of the
bank with which the decedent had done business were read at trial to show the state
of the decedents account at and after the execution of the checks. Some of the entries
had been made by persons who could not recall the contents of the entries but
testified that the account books were accurate.
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rule had been satisfied."' The court thereby ignored the requirement that
the makers of business entries be unavailable before such records may be
admitted into evidence.22 This misapplication of the "business records"
exception could have been avoided if the court had recognized the
applicability of the doctrine of past recollection recorded. 3
The Indiana Supreme Court has also misapplied the res gestae
exception to the hearsay rule in cases where admission of evidence upon
a past recollection recorded rationale could have been justified.24 Illustra-
tive is Place v. Baugher,2" wherein the supreme court upheld the trial
court's admission of entries from defendant's account books as being res
gestae although the defendant had made the entries sometime after his
transaction with the plaintiff.26 The court thus failed to recognize that the
justification for admission of evidence under the res gestae exception is
the minimal likelihood of fabricating statements made contemporaneously
with, or spontaneously during, a transaction.2"
In addition to allowing the admission of past recollection recorded
under exceptions to the hearsay rule, Indiana has allowed the admission
of such evidence through misapplication of the doctrine of present
recollection revived. As pointed our earlier, the docrine of past recollec-
tion recorded applies when a witness is not able to testify from memory
even with the aid of a memorandum. In contrast, the doctrine of present
recollection revived applies to situations in which a witness, by some
stimulus such as a written memorandum, has his recollection revived
to such an extent that he is able to testify from present memory.2"
Analyzed together, Prather v. Pritchard29 and Johnson v. Culver"0
demonstrate that the admission of past recollection recorded through
misapplication of the doctrine of present recollection revived occupies a
strong position in Indiana evidence law.
In Prather the supreme court held that a deponent who could recall
the approximate, but not the specific, details of a business transaction
could testify as to those specifics by reading from a memorandum pre-
21. 122 Ind. at 562-64, 23 N.E. at 1089-90.
22. McCoRmIcK, supra note 7, § 288; 5 WIGMoRE, supra note 6, § 1521 (3d ed.
1940, Supp. 1970).
23. See McCoRmIcK, supra note 7, § 280; 3 WIGmORE, supra note 6, § 737.
24. The cases involve the use of past recollection recorded as a substitute for
present memory. The safeguards designed to avoid abuse of the practice of allowing
such evidence could have been implemented easily. See notes 42-46 infra & text accom-
panying.
25. 159 Ind. 232, 64 N.E. 852 (1902).
26. Id. at 235-36, 64 N.E. at 853.
27. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1747 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1970).
28. McCORmIcK, supra note 7, § 9; Morgan, supra note 7, at 717.
29. 26 Ind. 65 (1866).
30. 116 Ind. 278, 19 N.E. 129 (1888).
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pared at the time of the transaction.3' Clearly this decision allows the use
of a record of past recollection as a substitute for present memory."
However, the court did not adopt the doctrine of past recollection record-
ed, nor did it base its decision on the rationale that any of the exceptions
to the hearsay rule applied. Arguably, an explanation of the basis of the
decision is provided by the supreme court's statement in Johnson:
A witness may refresh his memory by reference to a written
memorandum made by himself in a case where many items of
personal property are involved. He can not, to be sure, testify
entirely from the writing, for he must have a knowledge and
recollection independent of the memorandum, but for the
purpose of assisting his memory and giving accuracy to his
statements he may refer to what he has written.8
Johnson indicates that a witness with some degree of independent
recollection of the events recorded in the memorandum may use that
document to supply information not actually recalled. Such use is beyond
the normal scope of legitimate renewal of present memory34 and actually
constitutes the utilization of past recollection recorded as a substitute
therefor.85 However, this is precisely the rationale used by the supreme'
court in Richardson. The trial court's admission of the grand jury
foreman's testimony was upheld on the basis of the unpersuasive argu-
ment that the witness, in reading verbatim from the transcript, was not
using that document as a substitute for present memory. The Richardson
court may have felt justified in upholding admission of the evidence
because of its necessity under the circumstances. Also the court may have
assumed a minimal likelihood of abuse due to the witness's attested
independent recollection. However, the court's unwillingness to adopt the
doctrine of past recollection recorded forced it to base its decision upon
the unjustified holding that the witness used the transcript for "refreshing
recollection" rather than as a substitute for present memory.
Despite appearances to the contrary, Indiana has not completely
rejected the doctrine of past recollection recorded 6 but rather has
recognized a limited application of the rule. In Higgins v. State, 7 a
31. 26 Ind. at 67.
32. See notes 7-8 supra & text accompanying.
33. 116 Ind. at 290, 19 N.E. at 135, cited with approval in Sage v. State, 127 Ind.
15, 26 N.E. 667 (1891) and Southern Ry. v. State, 165 Ind. 613, 75 N.E. 272 (1905).
34. See note 28 supra & text accompanying.
35. See notes 7-8 supra & text accompanying.
36. See note 12 supra & text accompanying.
37. 157 Ind. 57, 60 N.E. 685 (1901).
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court stenographer was allowed by the trial court to read into evidence
notes he had taken at a prior grand jury investigation.38 In reviewing
the trial court proceedings, the supreme court used a past recollection
recorded rationale in upholding the admission of the evidence:
If a person takes the evidence at the time it is given, either in
longhand or shorthand, and can testify as to the accuracy of his
notes, they may be read in evidence, or he may refresh his
recollection from said notes, and testify from memory. Such
person may read in evidence such copy made at the time,
although aside from said copy he has no recollection of what the
witness said, and this may be done in all cases, when such
person would be allowed to testify to the same facts from
memory. 9
Despite the general language, this holding merely represents an acceptance
of the doctrine of past recollection recorded for the type of fact situation
represented by Higgins rather than an overall adoption of the rule.4"
To summarize, the approach of Indiana courts to situations in
which a record of past recollection is used as a substitute for present
memory has been notable for its inconsistency. Despite their general
refusal to adopt the doctrine, Indiana courts have sanctioned the admis-
sion of such evidence by utilizing exceptions to the hearsay rule and by
misapplying the doctrine of present recollection revived.
REFLECTIONS ON THE INDIANA APPROACH
The Indiana approach to the use of past recollection recorded as a
substitute for present memory is disturbing for several reasons. Initially,
refusal to adopt the doctrine of past recollection recorded has resulted in,
38. The safeguards designed to avoid abuse of the practice of allowing the use of
past recollection recorded as a substitute for present memory (see notes 42-46 infra
& text accompanying) were satisfied. The witness had no present recollection of the
"prior testimony," but testified that his notes of it were accurate. Id. at 63, 60 N.E.
at 687.
39. Id. at 63, 60 N.E. at 688.
40. See Sekularac v. State, 205 Ind. 98, 185 N.E. 898 (1933), where the supreme
court upheld the trial court's admission of the transcript of the testimony at a previous
hearing of a witness who was unavailable to testify at trial. The transcript had been
made by an unofficial stenographer who stated that she did not recollect the testimony
of the witness but that the transcript was an accurate record. It is not clear whether
the supreme court upheld the admission of the evidence on the ground that the require-
ments of the "prior testimony" exception to the hearsay rule were met or on a past
recollection recorded rationale. The indications are that the former ground was
utilized; indeed, the decision in Higgins, probably the best authority the court could
have used to justify a past recollection recorded rationale, was not even mentioned.
See also note 12 supra.
RICHARDSON v. STATE
or at least been directly linked to, the misapplication of hearsay exceptions.
Admission of out-of-court statements under any particular exception
may be justified primarily on two grounds: (1) if courts are to resolve
disputes justly, they must often admit an out-of-court statement as
probative of matters in issue; and (2) in certain situations the likeli-
hood of a false out-of-court statement is minimal. The prerequisites to
the admission of an out-of-court statement under an exception to the
hearsay rule are designed to insure that admission is justified upon these
grounds. To the extent that the admission of past recollection recorded
results in the acceptance of evidence in situations where the prerequisites
are not met, two undesirable results occur. First, admission of that
evidence can prejudice the party opposing admission. Second, precedents
are set by which improper evidence may be admitted in subsequent cases
under the doctrine of stare decisis. Hence, Indiana's misapplication of
exceptions to the hearsay rule in upholding admission of evidence which
could have been admitted under a past recollection recorded rationale is,
according to conventional wisdom, unjustifiable.4'
A second criticism of the Indiana approach lies in the use of records
of past recollection as a substitute for present memory without employing
safeguards designed to avoid abuses. This problem arises not only in
the decisions based on misapplication of hearsay exceptions, but also in
decisions which uphold admission of past recollection recorded through
misapplication of the doctrine of present recollection revived. The safe-
guards which must be met before such evidence can be admitted42 are:
41. See generally note 14 supra.
42. Since the memorandum is read into or admitted as evidence, the requirements
are designed to increase the probability that the writing is an adequate and correct
record of past recollection. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 734. Additionally, the "best
evidence!' rule requiring that the original be produced if procurable is applicable. Id.,
§ 749.
The requirements outlined here indicate that whether or not the memorandum is in
fact a correct record of past recollection depends on the credibility of the witness.
Therefore, it should be noted that the witness's credibility is not simply assumed when
he says that he perceived the events recorded in the memorandum, that the memorandum
is a correct record of those events and so forth. The party opposing the use of a memor-
andum must be given access to it for purposes of inspection and cross-examination.
Id., § 753. The party opposing the use of a memorandum can thus test the witness upon
the adequacy, identity and correctness of the writing. Of course, the argument is some-
times made that a piece of paper cannot be cross-examined and, therefore, the
practice of allowing the use of a memorandum as a substitute for present memory denies
the party opposing its use the right to confront the witnesses against him in a criminal
case. In response to this argument the Arizona Supreme Court correctly stated:
What is the purpose of cross-examination? Obviously it is to convince the
triers of fact, in some manner, that the testimony of the witness is untrue ...
How, then, may the truthfulness of the evidence of a witness be attacked
through cross-examination? It seems to us that all attacks thereon must be
reduced to one of three classes: (a) Upon the honesty and integrity of the
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(1) a present recollection must appear to be lacking;" (2) the witness
must have perceived the events set forth in the memorandum;44 (3)
the past recollection must have been recorded when fairly fresh in the
mind of the witness ;4 and (4) the witness must be able to assert that the
memorandum accurately represented his knowledge of the events at the
time it was made and that the evidence now offered is in fact identical
with the record formerly made.4"
Richardson provides an apt example of the failure to implement
these safeguards. The court did not require that the past recollection have
been recorded when fairly fresh in the mind of the witness, that the
witness be able to assert that the transcript was accurate or that the
transcript be identified as such. In summary, the Indiana courts, rather
than misapplying evidentiary doctrines, should have either candidly
recognized the doctrine of past recollection recorded or refused to admit
the evidence, thereby preserving the integrity of all the relevant doctrines.
The third problem inherent in Indiana's treatment of past recollection
witness; (b) upon his ability to observe accurately at the time the incident
occurred; and (c) upon his accuracy of recollection of the past events. When
a witness testifies as to his present recollection, independent or revived, he may,
of course, be cross-examined fully on all three points. When he testifies as to
his past recollection recorded, he can be examined to the same extent and in
the same manner as to the first and second of these matters. He cannot well be
cross-examined on the third point, but this is unnecessary, for he has already
stated that he has no independent recollection of the event, which is all that
could be brought out by the most rigid cross-examination on this point when
the witness testifies from his present recollection, independent or revived.
Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz. 201, 220, 65 P.2d 1141, 1149-50 (1937).
43. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 738. This requirement is not geared to assuring
the adequacy, identity or correctness of the record or to securing the best available
memory of the witness; rather, it is based on the notion that the credibility of a
witness testifying from present memory can be tested better than the credibility of a
witness who uses a record of past recollection as a substitute for present memory.
Because the requirement is not so geared, the wisdom of maintaining the requirement
has been questioned. Both Wigmore and McCormick advocate abandoning the require-
ment. Id.; McCoRMICIC, supra note 7, § 277.
44. McCoRMICK, supra note 7, § 277.
45. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 745.
46. Id., §§ 746-47. The witness need not have been the writer so long as the
memorandum can be identified and verified as an accurate record of the events to
be proved. Id., §§ 748, 750-52; McCoRMICK, supra note 7, § 279. A number of situations
can arise in which the witness has not himself made the memorandum, but it is, never-
theless, admissible as evidence. The first occurs when the witness has not made the
memorandum but testifies that when the event recorded was fresh in his mind, he read
the document and knew it was true. In the second situation, the witness has made a
writing which another person has copied; the witness testifies that his writing was
correct, and the person who made the copy testifies that the copy accurately reproduced
the witness's writing. In this situation the copy is admissible as evidence. The third
situation arises when the witness has reported the facts orally to another person who
has written them down; the witness testifies that his oral report was correct, and the
person who made the memorandum testifies that he recorded the witness's oral report
correctly.
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recorded may be illustrated by the state of the law following Sage47 and
prior to Higgins.4" Despite the correctness of Sage,49 that decision,
coupled with the courts' refusal to recognize the doctrine of past recollec-
tion recorded, created the possibility of arbitrary and capricious, though
doctrinally sound, results. Following Sage, the courts recognized the
"prior testimony" exception to the hearsay rule but did not recognize the
doctrine of past recollection recorded. Consequently, when prior testimony
of an unavailable witness was offered as evidence, an Indiana court
could have either admitted the evidence on the ground that the require-
ments of the "prior testimony" exception to the hearsay rule were met or
rejected it on the ground that it was past recollection recorded and there-
fore inadmissible. Either decision would have been doctrinally sound
prior to Higgins. Although Higgins obviated this danger in cases involv-
ing "prior testimony" through limited adoption of the doctrine of past
recollection recorded,"° the danger still exists in cases involving res
gestae. A situation could arise in which a person who had spontaneously
recorded figures during the occurrence of an event testifies that he has no
present recollection of the figures but that his record is accurate. In such
a situation a court would have the alternative of admitting the evidence
under the res gestae exception or rejecting it as inadmissible past
recollection recorded. Once again, either decision would be doctrinally
sound. However, as in the pre-Higgins situation, potential danger exists
in that arbitrary decisions could result.' The type of evidence involved is
clearly past recollection recorded. 2 Since the courts believe that admis-
47. 127 Ind. 15, 26 N.E. 667 (1891). See notes 15-17 supra & text accompanying.
48. 157 Ind. 57, 60 N.E. 685 (1901). See notes 37-40 supra & text accompanying.
49. All prerequisites to the admission of evidence under the "prior testimony"
exception to the hearsay rule were satisfied. See note 18 supra.
50. The recognition in Higgins of the doctrine of past recollection recorded
for stenographer situations cannot be criticized. Higgins utilized the safeguards
associated with the doctrine. The possibility of abuse of the practice of allowing the
use of a memorandum as a substitute for present memory in the Higgins situation is
probably less than in any other type of situation. A stenographer is usually a trained
specialist in recording testimony and has nothing to gain by falsifying the record.
Additionally, evidence of a stenographer's past experience and accuracy is readily
available for impeachment purposes.
51. A situation might also arise in which a person who has made a memorandum
of a business transaction is unavailable to testify. The court would have two alter-
natives: (1) it could admit the evidence under the "business records" exception to
the hearsay rule; or, (2) it could reject it as inadmissible past recollection recorded.
Acceptance of the doctrine -of past recollection recorded for this situation is theoretical-
ly impossible, for the witness by hypothesis is unavailable to testify that he perceived
the event recorded, that his record is accurate and so forth. Hopefully, however, the
courts will properly define this situation as one to which the "business records" exception
applies and not as one involving inadmissible past recollection recorded. In this manner,
the danger of arbitrary decisions would be avoided.
52. See notes 7-8 supra & text accompanying.
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sion of such evidence is warranted on one ground, they should, in the
situations discussed, also allow admission upon the rationale that it is
admissible past recollection recorded." By doing so, the Indiana courts
would eliminate the danger of arbitrary and capricious decisions in these
situations.
JAY F. COOK
53. This does not necessarily mean that the courts should adopt the doctrine of
past recollection recorded for all situations to which it normally applies. The courts
may be justified in their reluctance to adopt the doctrine completely. However, the
danger of inconsistent holdings is sufficient to warrant adoption of the doctrine for
those situations in which the danger exists.
